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DEATH PENALTY: AN OVERDUE 
EXEMPTION FOR THE SEVERELY 
MENTALLY ILL 
 JOSEPHINE MARINO*  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A Texas man shaved his head, dressed in camouflage, and 
carried an armed sawed-off shotgun and a deer rifle as he went to 
his parents-in-law’s home.1 He shot them at close range in front of 
his wife and three-year-old daughter.2 He then kept his wife and 
daughter hostage in a bunkhouse where he had been living and 
only released them to safety after a lengthy standoff with the 
police.3 A Texas jury convicted him of capital murder and 
sentenced him to death.4 
Now consider a man who has suffered from severe mental illness 
for over thirty years.5 His judgment is severely impaired, and his 
thinking and perception are profoundly disturbed.6 He has been 
diagnosed with chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia and 
schizoaffective disorder and has been prescribed antipsychotic 
medication to alleviate some of his symptoms while his auditory 
and visual hallucinations only exacerbate his delusions of 
paranoia and grandiosity.7 He is unable to overcome the delusions, 
and he believes that he is engaged in spiritual warfare with Satan 
as his psychotic religiosity takes over.8 
 
*J.D. Candidate, St. John’s University, School of Law, Class of 2016. 
1  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Panetti v. Stephens, No. 13-8453, 2014 WL 3687250, 
at *5 (5th Cir. 2014) 
2 Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 2013). 
3 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at *6. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at *3. 
6 Id. at *4. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at *4-5. 
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These two stories are both true.  These frightening realities 
describe the actual realities of one man, Scott Panetti.  In the first 
story describing Panetti’s crime, Panetti is a cold-hearted 
murderer.  In the second story describing his complex and unstable 
mental history, Panetti is a man tormented by the mysterious and 
dark workings of his mind.  When the two are blended together, 
the heartbreaking tale of Scott Panetti is created with many 
victims – his parents-in-law, his wife, his daughter, his parents, 
and even Panetti himself.  
“The death penalty is the gravest sentence our society may 
impose” and “[p]ersons facing that most severe sanction must have 
a fair opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits their 
execution.”9 Over the years, the Supreme Court has refused to 
inflict the death penalty on several groups of individuals because 
doing so would be a clear and gross violation of the Constitution’s 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.10 These exempted groups 
include juvenile offenders,11 intellectually disabled offenders,12 
and insane offenders.13 
However, no such exemption has been created for offenders who 
are severely mentally ill. In fact, in 2015, Scott Panetti petitioned 
the Supreme Court for review of his capital sentence whereby he 
claimed that he was severely mentally ill and argued that 
executing the severely mentally ill is a violation of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause.14 In denying the petition for review, 
the Supreme Court gave no explanation or indication for the 
reasons behind its denial.15 Without any detailed insight from the 
Supreme Court and an approximation that between twenty 
percent of all individuals on death row suffer from severe mental 
illness, it is more than likely that more appeals on behalf of other 
 
9 Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014). 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. (stating “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”). 
11 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).  
12 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
13 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 399 (1986). 
14 Panetti v. Texas, No. 14–7312, 2015 WL 133411 at *1 (U.S. June 12, 2015). Panetti’s 
petition for writ of certiorari to determine whether he cannot be executed due to severe 
mental illness was denied.  
15 Id.  “Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas denied.” 
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severely mentally ill individuals on death row will be made in the 
near future.16 
This Note takes the position that an exemption for severely 
mentally ill offenders from the death penalty is not only 
warranted, but also long overdue.  Part I will use the Supreme 
Court’s own opinion in Hall v. Florida to make the argument that 
the Supreme Court has theoretically carved out such an exemption 
in its prior opinions, which it must now follow.  This Note heavily 
relies on Hall for two reasons.  First, in Hall, the Court was 
addressing intellectually disabled offenders and much of its 
opinion can be applied to severely mentally ill offenders.  Second, 
the Court delivered the Hall opinion in 2014.  It is the most recent 
death penalty opinion, and its expressed ideas of punishment are 
consistent with the Court’s earlier exemption-creating death 
penalty cases, which are used throughout the opinion and its 
antecedents.   
Part II will concentrate on the absence of the three principle 
rationales justifying punishment when executing an intellectually 
disabled offender, and how such an absence equally exists when a 
severely mentally ill offender is executed.  Further, this Note will 
use the Hall opinion to demonstrate how the Supreme Court 
deferred to mental health professionals and the medical 
community when reaffirming the exemption for intellectually 
disabled offenders and how such deference is warranted for 
creating an exemption for severely mentally ill offenders. 
Part III will focus on the Supreme Court’s “evolving standard of 
human decency” test that it has created specifically for death 
penalty cases.  This Note will provide two examples – one domestic 
and one international – as evidence demonstrating society’s 
overall reluctance on executing offenders with mental illness.  
These examples show that executions of the severely mentally ill 
violate the “evolving standards of human decency” test, 
demanding that the Supreme Court create an exemption for the 
 
16 Id.  This estimate is from Mental Health America; the association is formerly known 
as National Mental Health Association. Mental Health America, Position Statement 54: 
Death Penalty and People with Mental Illness, 
http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/positions/death-penalty (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). 
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severely mentally ill from the death penalty on the grounds of the 
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.17 
Part IV will revisit the Supreme Court’s opinions in both Ford 
v. Wainwright and Hall, taking an in depth look at the state’s 
procedures used in those cases and the reasons for holding that 
such procedures were unconstitutional.  The Supreme Court has 
left the task of developing execution and sentencing procedures to 
the states and, using both Ford and Hall, this Note will provide 
some guidance on the minimum procedures that the Supreme 
Court should require for states in assessing severe mental illness, 
satisfying the Eighth Amendment. 
 
II. LEGAL PRECEDENT CARVES OUT AN EXEMPTION FOR THE 
SEVERELY MENTALLY ILL 
A. Three Principle Justifications for Punishment 
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has carved out several 
exemptions from capital punishment for particular groups of 
individuals.18 Throughout these opinions, the Court has laid out 
the principle justifications for punishment, which have become its 
template when deciding the constitutionality of capital 
punishment.  As recently as 2014, the Court, yet again, resorted 
to this template in Hall.19 There, the Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Atkins v. Virginia, which created an exemption for intellectually 
disabled offenders by throwing out Florida’s threshold IQ cut off 
to determine death penalty eligibility.20 It found that “no 
 
17 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 
(1958)). 
18 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (stating that juvenile offenders cannot constitutionally be 
given the death penalty); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that for the intellectually 
disabled, a death penalty sentence is excessive); see also Ford, 477 U.S. at 410 (stating that 
the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from inflicting the death penalty upon insane 
offenders). 
19 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1990 (finding that where Hall and his accomplice kidnapped, beat, 
raped, and murdered their pregnant twenty-one-year-old victim, in addition to robbing a 
convenience store and shooting the sheriff’s deputy, the death penalty, as applied to Hall 
was an unconstitutional punishment because of Hall’s intellectual disability). 
20 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 2001; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321: 
Our independent evaluation of the issue reveals no reason to disagree with the judgment 
of ‘the legislatures that have recently addressed the matter’ and concluded that death is 
not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. We are not persuaded that the 
execution of mentally retarded criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the 
retributive purpose of the death penalty. Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment 
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legitimate penological purpose is served by executing a person 
with intellectual disability.”21 Further, it stated that to do so 
contravenes the Eighth Amendment, “for to impose the harshest 
of punishments on an intellectually disabled person violates his or 
her inherent dignity as a human being.”22 
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court identified the three 
principle rationales justifying punishment – rehabilitation, 
deterrence, and retribution – which we have seen throughout its 
death penalty opinions.23 First, the Supreme Court reasonably 
and logically conceded that rehabilitation is not an applicable 
rationale for the death penalty.24 Second, it noted that the premise 
of the deterrence rationale is not served by executing those that, 
because of their condition, are “unable to make calculated 
judgments” and have “‘diminished ability’ to ‘process information, 
to learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to 
control impulses . . . [which] make[s] it less likely that they can 
process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty 
and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that 
information.’”25 Last, the Supreme Court reasoned that retributive 
values are not fulfilled by executing those who have diminished 
capacity, which “lesse[ns] [their] moral culpability and, hence, the 
retributive value of the punishment.”26 Thus, no justification for 
punishment is served by executing individuals who “by definition 
. . . have diminished capacities to understand and process 
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn 
 
in the light of our ‘evolving standards of decency,’ we therefore conclude that such 
punishment is excessive and that the Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the 
State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender. 
21 Hall, 134 S.Ct at 1992 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 320). After Atkins was decided, 
Hall filed a motion claiming that he had an intellectual disability and, therefore, he could 
not be executed. When Florida held a hearing to consider his motion, Hall again presented 
evidence of his intellectual disability, including an IQ test score of 71. In response, Florida 
argued that its law required that, as a threshold matter, Hall show an IQ score of 70 or 
below before he could present any additional evidence of his intellectual disability, so 
therefore, he could not be found intellectually disabled. 
22 Id. at 1992.  
23 Id. (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008)). 
24 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1993. 
25 Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320). 
26 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1993 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319) (“If the culpability of the 
average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, 
the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of 
retribution.”). 
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from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control 
impulses, and to understand the reactions of others, because these 
individuals bear “diminish[ed] . . . personal culpability” and there 
is no retributive value gained from their execution.27 
The three principle justifications for punishment that the 
Supreme Court concluded were not served by executing 
intellectually disabled offenders in Hall – high culpability, 
effective deterrence, and rehabilitation – which are also absent 
when a severely mentally ill offender is executed.28 First, as the 
Court pointed out in Hall, rehabilitation does not apply to the 
death penalty.29 Second, the death penalty does not deter 
offenders who suffer from severe mental illness.30 Because a 
severely mentally ill offender is unable to assess reality, he is also 
unable to be deterred by possible punishments like the death 
penalty.31 
Finally, the severely mentally ill have reduced culpability.32 
Offenders who suffer from delusions and other effects of severe 
mental illness are unable to fully comprehend their actions and 
the consequences of those actions.33 Although these offenders may 
have committed some of the most horrific crimes, scholars still 
argue that the characteristics of severe mental illness make these 
defendants less culpable than defendants without severe mental 
illnesses.34Such characteristics include the inability to conform 
one’s actions to society’s moral standards, the lack of 
understanding that one’s actions are wrong, and continuing to 
commit the crime because of one’s illness.35  
Additionally, the Supreme Court has considered the impact of 
the trial process from a defendant’s condition.  The risk of unfair 
 
27 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1999 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318). 
28 Lise E. Rahdert, Hall v. Florida and Ending the Death Penalty for Severely Mentally 
Ill Defendants, 124 YALE L.J. 34, 38 (2014). 
29 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992–93 (2014). 
30 Id. at 1993 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002)); see Lyn Entzeroth, The 
Challenge and Dilemma of Charting a Course to Constitutionally Protect the Severely 
Mentally Ill Capital Defendant from the Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REV. 529, 549 (2011). 
31 Rahdert, supra note 28, at 38. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 38 n.31 (citing Entzeroth, supra note 30, at 556 (“noting that severe mental 
illnesses such as schizophrenia’ can disable and deprive their victims of rational thought 
processes and control,’ and citing relevant psychological research.”). 
34 Rahdert, supra note 28, at 38. 
35 Id. 
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trial is present for severely mentally ill offenders because, like 
intellectually disabled offenders, they are unable to effectively 
participate in their own defense.36 The Supreme Court has even 
recognized that, prior to the imposition of bans on executing 
juveniles and the intellectually disabled, jurors viewed the 
defendant’s youth or intellectual disability as making him “more 
dangerous and deserving of death.”37 In Hall, the Supreme Court 
held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on executing the 
intellectually disabled “protect[s] the integrity of the trial 
process.”38The trial process is similarly compromised with the 
execution of severely mentally ill offenders, and therefore, a ban 
on executing them must be imposed.39 
Therefore, because the reasons for exempting the intellectually 
disabled “apply equally to profoundly mentally ill defendants, it is 
both unjustifiable and inconsistent for the Court to allow those 
with a severe mental illness to be executed.”40 No purpose is 
served by executing individuals who suffer from severe mental 
illness and without purpose, the punishment is cruel, unusual, 
and hence, unconstitutional.41 
 
36 Id. at 38-39 (citing Entzeroth, supra note 30, at 558) (noting that a mentally ill 
defendant is less able to “assist in his defense, make rational legal decisions, or adequately 
advise his lawyer about meaningful defenses.”).  
37 Entzeroth, supra note 30, at 546. 
38 Rahdert, supra note 28, at 40. 
39 Id. at 40. 
40 Id. at 38 (citing Enzteroth, supra note 30, at 557-58; Christopher Slobogin, Mental 
Illness and the Death Penalty, 1 CAL. CRIM. L. REV 3 (2000) (discussing various arguments 
for preventing mentally ill defendants with psychoses from being executed). 
41 Outside the scope of this Note, but important to consider, is the argument raised by 
Judge Price of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. While supporting the premise of this 
Note by saying “I can imagine no rational reason for carving a line between the prohibition 
on the execution of a mentally retarded person or an insane person while permitting the 
execution of a severely mentally ill person,” his argument is a broader one. He argues that, 
“carving out another group that is ineligible for the death penalty is a band aid solution for 
the real problem. Evolving societal values indicate that the death penalty should be 
abolished in its entirety.” This argument is based on the idea of human error. “[S]ociety is 
now less convinced of the absolute accuracy of the criminal justice system.” “[B]ecause the 
criminal justice system is run by humans, it is naturally subject to human error.” Therefore, 
“[t]here is no rational basis to believe that this same type of human error will not infect 
capital murder trials. Ex parte Panetti, No. WR–37,145–04, 2014 WL 6974007, at *1-2 
(Price, J., dissenting). Although Judge Price makes a compelling argument, this Note 
agrees with the former part of his dissenting opinion but declines to embrace the position 
in the latter because abolishment of the death penalty does not seem to be in the near 
horizon. 
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B. The Court’s Deference to Mental Health Professionals 
In Hall, the Supreme Court acknowledged how it has, along with 
state courts and legislatures, consulted and learned from medical 
experts in the past.42 In the context of mental health, the Supreme 
Court cites to these professionals because they use their expertise 
to study and assess the consequences of the classification schemes 
used in diagnosing mental or psychiatric disorders or 
disabilities.43 Further, the Supreme Court noted that society relies 
upon this medical and professional expertise, which only 
highlights the importance of the medical community and how 
proper the Supreme Court thinks their influence is.44 
Once again, the Court’s deference to the mental health 
professionals in Hall and the context of intellectual disability 
equally applies in the context of severe mental illness.  Similar to 
death penalty cases involving intellectually disabled offenders, the 
medical and legal communities have come together to oppose the 
death penalty for individuals with severe mental illness.  The 
arguments mirror one another and are outlined below. 
The American Psychiatric Association (the “APA”) is an 
organization composed of psychiatrists “working together to 
ensure humane care and effective treatment for all persons with 
mental disorders . . . .”45 The APA is extensively cited by the 
Supreme Court in Hall and mentioned in Roper v. Simmons, 
where the Supreme Court carved out the exemption for juvenile 
offenders.46 Part of the APA’s mission is to “promote the highest 
quality care for individuals with mental disorders” and to 
“promote psychiatric education and research.”47 
In particular, the APA is cited for its Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”), which is a diagnostic system 
and manual used by psychiatrists and other experts as well as the 
 
42 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1993. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Mission, Vision, and Values, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
https://www.psychiatry.org/about-apa/vision-mission-values-goals (last visited Oct 23, 
2016). 
46 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1988, 1994, 2000. In fact, a majority of the Court’s citations were 
direct quotes from the amici curiae brief submitted by the APA. 
47 Mission, Vision, and Values, supra note 45. 
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Supreme Court.48 The DSM considers Axis I diagnoses the most 
serious or severe disorders, including schizophrenia and other 
psychotic disorders, mania, major depressive disorder, and 
dissociative disorders.49 All of these disorders are serious because 
they are typically associated with delusions, hallucinations, 
extremely disorganized thinking, or very significant disruption of 
consciousness, memory, and perception of the environment.50 Axis 
I diagnoses constitute what is considered “severe mental illness.” 
Accompanied by the APA, the American Psychological 
Association, the National Alliance on Mental Illness, and the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) have joined “a widening chorus 
of professionals calling for a halt to death sentences and executions 
for defendants with severe mental disorders, which ‘significantly 
impaired’ their rational judgment or capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of their conduct.” 
Recently, the ABA made several recommendations for cases 
where a criminal defendant, who suffers from a severe mental 
illness, faces the death penalty.  In its Recommendation and 
Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities 
(the “Recommendation”), the ABA recognizes that Atkins “offered 
a timely opportunity to consider the extent, if any, to which other 
types of impaired mental conditions ought to lead to exemption 
from the death penalty.”51  
The ABA strongly urges every jurisdiction that imposes capital 
punishment to adopt its guidelines and created the Task Force on 
Mental Disability and the Death Penalty.52 The Task Force is 
composed of both lawyers and mental health professionals, 
including members of the APA and the American Psychological 
Association.53 
The Task Force guidelines urge strongly against executing or 
sentencing a defendant to death who, at the time of the offense, 
 
48 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1990. There are different editions of the manual. The Hall Court 
cites to both the DSM-IV and DSM-V, which suggests that both have significance and 
authority. 
49 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL, 25-26 (4th ed. 2000). 
50 Id. at 275-76 (schizophrenia), 301 (delusional disorders), 332-33 (mood disorder with 
psychotic features), 125 (delirium), 477 (dissociative disorders). 
51 Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental 
Disabilities, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 668, 669 (2006). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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was under a severe mental disorder.  More specifically, the ABA 
provides: 
Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, 
at the time of the offense, they had a severe mental disorder 
or disability that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to 
appreciate the nature, consequences or wrongfulness of 
their conduct, (b) to exercise rational judgment in relation 
to conduct, or (c) to conform their conduct to the 
requirements of the law. A disorder manifested primarily by 
repeated criminal conduct of attributable solely to the acute 
effects of voluntary use of alcohol or other drugs does not, 
standing alone, constitute a mental disorder or disability for 
purposes of this provision.54 
The ABA explains that this section is “meant to prohibit 
execution of persons with severe mental disability whose 
demonstrated impairments of mental and emotional functioning 
at the time of the offense would render a death sentence 
disproportionate to their culpability.”55 In explaining the rationale 
behind this section, the ABA cites the reasons behind the holding 
in Atkins, and more specifically, the absence of the three principle 
justifications for punishment previously discussed.56 
Further, the ABA clarifies that its Recommendation is meant to 
reach offenders who have a “‘severe’ disorder or disability, one 
roughly equivalent to disorders that mental health professionals 
would consider the most serious ‘Axis I diagnoses.’”57 The ABA 
explains that other conditions that are not technically an Axis I 
condition may also classify as “severe” in its Recommendation, but 
“only if these more serious symptoms occur at the time of the 
 
54 Id. at 670. 
55 Id. at 672 (emphasis added). 
56 Id. (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-19) (“More specifically . . . [the Atkins Court] held 
that people with mental retardation who kill are both less culpable and less deterrable than 
the average murderer, because of their ‘diminished capacities to understand and process 
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to 
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.’ 
As the Court noted, ‘[i]f the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the 
most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded 
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution.’ Similarly, with respect to 
deterrence, the Court stated, ‘[e]xempting the mentally retarded from [the death penalty] 
will not affect the ‘cold calculus that precedes the decision’ of other potential murderers.”). 
57 Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental 
Disabilities, supra note 51, at 670. 
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capital offense would the predicate for this Recommendation’s 
exemption be present.”58 The purpose of this section of the ABA’s 
Recommendation is to make sure that its exemption only applies 
to “offenders less culpable and less deterrable than the average 
murderer” and does so by “further requir[ing] that the disorder 
significantly impair cognitive or volitional function at the time of 
the offense.”59 
The ABA explains the types of offenders that this provision is 
meant to protect.  Section (a) would apply to “offenders who, 
because of severe disorder or disability, did not intend to engage 
in the conduct constituting the crime or were unaware they were 
committing it” and “offenders who intended to commit the crime 
and knew that the conduct was wrongful, but experienced 
confusion and self-referential thinking that prevented them from 
recognizing its full ramifications.”60 Section (b) would apply to 
offenders with “the type of disoriented, incoherent and delusional 
thinking that only people with serious mental disability 
experience.”61 Last, Section (c) would probably apply to offenders 
who “experience significant cognitive impairment at the time of 
the crime.”62 
The ABA continues to set guidelines for these criminal 
defendants exhibiting severe mental illness in the conviction 
process. It provides certain grounds for precluding execution: 
A sentence of death should not be carried out if the prisoner 
has a mental disorder or disability that significantly 
impairs his or her capacity (i) to make a rational decision to 
forgo or terminate post-conviction proceedings available to 
challenge the validity of the conviction or sentence; (ii) to 
understand or communicate pertinent information, or 
otherwise assist counsel, in relation to specific claims 
bearing on the validity of the conviction or sentence that 
cannot be fairly resolved without the prisoner’s 
participation; or (iii) to understand the nature and purpose 
 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 671. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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of the punishment, or to appreciate the reason for its 
imposition in the prisoner’s own case . . . .63 
In addition, the ABA continues to set forth guidelines for cases 
involving prisoners seeking to forgo or terminate post-conviction, 
cases involving prisoners unable to assist counsel in post-
conviction proceedings, and cases involving prisoners unable to 
understand the punishment or its purpose.64 
Therefore, it is readily apparent that both the legal and medical 
communities have strived to emphasize the injustice and 
immorality that come from executing individuals with severe 
mental illness.  In fact, the Supreme Court’s template based on the 
three principle rationales for punishment are central themes to 
the APA’s and ABA’s definitions of severe mental illness, as well 
as the ABA’s Recommendation.  Further, these are the precise 
communities that should be given deference by the Supreme Court 
in determining an exemption for the severe mentally ill as it has 
in the past for the currently exempted groups. 
 
III. THE EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY 
 
Also, evident in these exemption-creating opinions is the 
Supreme Court’s reliance on “‘the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society’ to determine which 
punishments are so disproportionate to be ‘cruel and unusual.’”65  
The Supreme Court professes its duty to strike down law that 
“contravenes our Nation’s commitment to dignity” and that 
“den[ies] the basic dignity that the Constitution protects.”66 
 
63 Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental 
Disabilities, supra note 51, at 671. 
64 Id. at 668. 
65 Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101). “Not bound by the 
sparing humanitarian concessions of our forebears, the Amendment also recognizes the 
‘evolving standards of decency that marks the progress of a maturing society.’” Ford, 477 
U.S. at 406 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101). “Construing and applying the Eighth 
Amendment in the light of our ‘evolving standards of decency,’ we therefore conclude that 
such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on 
the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 
(quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405). “Florida’s law contravenes our Nation’s commitment to 
dignity and its duty to teach human decency as the mark of a civilized world.” Hall, 134 
S.Ct. at 2001. 
66 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 2001. 
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Few, if any, would argue that executing severely mentally ill 
offenders meets any standard of decency, or that doing so is what 
marks the United States as a mature society.  In fact, society has 
begun to not only move away from the idea of executing severely 
mentally ill offenders, but rather, is actively seeking that it is 
prohibited to do so. 
A poll released in December 2014 found that Americans oppose 
the death penalty for individuals suffering from mental illness by 
a margin of 2 to 1.67 Public Policy Polling conducted this 
nationwide poll, which consisted of a survey of 943 registered 
voters.68 The survey found that 58% of respondents would oppose 
the death penalty for individuals suffering from mental illness.69 
Remarkably, the opposition is very evenly distributed.  First, the 
“opposition was consistent across all political parties – 62% of 
Democrats, 59% of Republicans, and 51% of Independents.70 
Second, opposition was also consistent across all regions of the 
country” – 64% from the Midwest, 61% from the West, and 55% 
from both the South and Northeast.71 Last, “opposition to the 
death penalty for persons” suffering from mental illness was 
“strong across both genders and all income and education levels.”72 
Robert Smith, an assistant law professor at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill commissioned this survey.73 He 
stated that this poll carries great significance as new research, 
which shows an “emerging consensus against using capital 
punishment in cases where the defendant is mentally ill.”74 
Further, “[t]he poll joins other new data demonstrating that 
sentencing trends are down across the country for death-eligible 
defendants with severe mental illness.  Combining this public 
polling, sentencing practices, and the recommendations of the 
 
67 Press Release, Laura Burstein, New Nationwide Poll Shows Americans Oppose 
Death Penalty in Cases where Person has Mental Illness By 2-1 Margin (Dec. 1, 2014) 
(available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1LFfr8Iqz_7RDJBZzA2NGJzWG8/view).   
68 Id. This survey “was conducted on November 24-25, 2014 and has a margin of error 





73 Press Release, Laura Burstein, New Nationwide Poll Shows Americans Oppose 
Death Penalty in Cases where Person has Mental Illness By 2-1 Margin (Dec. 1, 2014) 
(available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1LFfr8Iqz_7RDJBZzA2NGJzWG8/view).   
74 Burstein, supra note 67. 
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mental health medical community, it is clear that a consensus is 
emerging against the execution of a person like Scott Panetti, who 
suffers from a debilitating illness which is similar to intellectual 
disability in that it lessens both his culpability and social value of 
his execution.”75 
Amnesty International is an organization that advocates for 
prisoners and people at risk “whose human rights have been 
violated or are under threat of violation.”76 One of the areas of 
focus for Amnesty International is the death penalty and mental 
illness specifically in the United States.  In fact, its webpage 
features a quote by Yvonne Panetti, mother of Scott Panetti, where 
she stated, “He did a terrible thing, but he was sick. Where is the 
compassion? Is this the best our society can do?”77 
Amnesty International reports provide the international 
standard of human decency in one report, stating that “[t]he 
execution of those with mental illness or ‘the insane’ is clearly 
prohibited by international law. Virtually every country in the 
world prohibits the execution of people with mental illness.”78 
However, the United States, as recently as early 2014, has 
executed individuals with long histories of severe mental illness, 
along with India, Japan, and Pakistan.79 For support, Amnesty 
International lists findings of international resolutions.  First, in 
1997, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions found that governments continue to use the 
death penalty “with respect to . . . the mentally ill are particularly 
called upon to bring their domestic legislation into conformity with 
international legal standards.”80 Second, in 2000, the UN 
Commission on Human Rights urged all states that still maintain 
 
75 Id. 
76 Prisoners and People at Risk, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-
work/issues/prisoners-and-people-at-risk (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
77 Death Penalty and Mental Illness, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-
work/issues/death-penalty/us-death-penalty-facts/death-penalty-and-mental-illness (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
78 Id. 
79 2014 World Day Against the Death Penalty: Protecting People with Mental and 
Intellectual Disabilities from the Use of the Death Penalty, AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 2014), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/4000/act510052014en.pdf. 
80 Death Penalty and Mental Illness, supra note 77. 
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the death penalty “not to impose it on a person suffering from any 
form of mental disorder; not to execute any such person.”81  
The two examples above demonstrate how both the domestic 
community and the international community are strongly against 
executing severely mentally ill offenders.  Therefore, an exemption 
must be created for these individuals because society’s standards 
have clearly evolved away from executing them.  Under its own 
test, the Supreme Court must do away with punishments that are 
not in conformity with its evolving human decency standard. 
 
IV. PROPOSED EXEMPTION 
 
Because of the Supreme Court’s own precedent, an exemption is 
warranted for severely mentally ill offenders facing the death 
penalty.  Some of the Supreme Court’s opinions in exemption-
creating death penalty cases have considered at-length state tests 
for death penalty eligibility. This section of the Note examines the 
procedures for assessing mental illness and offers some key 
guidance. 
A. Ford v. Wainwright 
In Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he 
Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from inflicting the penalty 
of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”82 There, the question 
before the Supreme Court was whether the Florida district court 
was obligated to hold an evidentiary hearing on the question of the 
habeas corpus petitioner’s sanity.83 At the time, Florida law 
directed the governor to stay the execution and appoint a 
commission of three psychiatrists when informed that a person 
under the sentence of death may be insane.84 More specifically, 
Florida law provided that “[t]he examination of the convicted 
person shall take place with all three psychiatrists present at the 
same time.”85 “After receiving the report of the commission, the 
Governor must determine whether ‘the convicted person has the 
 
81 Id. 
82 Ford, 477 U.S. at 410. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 412. 
85 Id.  
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mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and 
the reasons why it was imposed on him’ and “if the Governor finds 
that the prisoner has that capacity, then a death warrant is issued; 
if not, then the prisoner is committed to a mental health facility. 
The procedure is conducted wholly within the executive branch, ex 
parte, and provides the exclusive means for determining sanity.”86 
The reports of the three examining psychiatrists reached 
conflicting diagnoses but the same ultimate finding of 
competency.87 Petitioner’s counsel attempted to submit other 
written materials to the governor, including reports of two other 
psychiatrists who examined his client in greater detail.88 
However, the governor did not inform counsel whether his 
submission would be considered and subsequently made his 
decision by issuing a death warrant.89 
The Supreme Court found that Florida’s procedural review 
“fail[ed] to achieve even the minimal degree of reliability required 
for the protection of any constitutional interest . . . .”90 The 
Supreme Court noted several deficiencies in Florida’s procedure. 
First, the procedure failed to include the prisoner in the “truth-
seeking process” and to acknowledge the “Court’s longstanding 
pronouncement that ‘[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of 
law is the opportunity to be heard.’”91 Further, “[i]n all other 
proceedings leading to the execution of an accused, [the Supreme 
Court] has said that the factfinder must ‘have before it all possible 
relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it 
must determine.”92 A procedure that “precludes the prisoner or his 
counsel from presenting material relevant to his sanity or bars 
 
86 Id. at 412. 
87 Id. 
88 Ford, 477 U.S. at 413. One of petitioner’s psychiatrists concluded that petitioner was 
not competent to be executed. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 411-13.  The Supreme Court also found that the procedure in place fell short 
of the adequacy under Townsend. “The adequacy of a state-court procedure under 
Townsend is largely a function of the circumstances and the interests at stake. In capital 
proceedings, generally, this Court has demanded that fact-finding procedures aspire to a 
heightened standard of reliability (citation omitted). This especial concern is a natural 
consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of 
penalties; that death is different (citation omitted).”  
91 Id. at 413 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). 
92 Ford, 477 U.S. at 413 (quoting Jurek v. Tex., 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality 
opinion)). 
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consideration of that material by the factfinder is necessarily 
inadequate.”93  Additionally, “the minimum assurance that the 
life-and-death guess will be a truly informed guess requires 
respect for the basic ingredient of due process, namely, an 
opportunity to be allowed to substantiate a claim before it is 
rejected.”94 
In the context of mental illness, the Supreme Court recognized 
that because “‘psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on 
what constitutes mental illness [and] on the appropriate diagnosis 
to be attached to given behavior and symptoms,’ the factfinder 
must resolve differences in opinion within the psychiatric 
profession ‘on the basis of the evidence offered by each 
party. . . .’”95 It further noted that “[t]he same holds true after 
conviction; without any adversarial assistance from the prisoner’s 
representative-especially when the psychiatric opinion he proffers 
is based on much more extensive evaluation than that of the state-
appointed commission—the factfinder loses the substantial 
benefit of potentially probative information. The result is a much 
greater likelihood of an erroneous decision.”96 
The second deficiency the Supreme Court found in Florida’s 
procedure was the inability to challenge or impeach the opinions 
of the psychiatrists appointed by the state.97 The Supreme Court 
then suggested that cross-examination of the psychiatrists or 
something less formal to that extent because it would “contribute 
markedly to the process of seeking truth in sanity disputes by 
bringing to light the bases for each expert’s beliefs, the precise 
factors underlying those beliefs, any history of error or caprice of 
the examiner, any personal bias with respect to the issue of capital 
punishment, the expert’s degree of certainty about his or her own 
conclusions, and the precise meaning of ambiguous words used in 
the report.”98 The Court further stated that some questioning of 
the experts concerning their technical conclusions is needed 
otherwise “a factfinder simply cannot be expected to evaluate the 
various opinions particularly when they are themselves 
 
93 Ford, 477 U.S. at 414. 
94 Id. (quoting Solesbee v. Balkcom, 399 U.S. 9, 23 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
95 Ford, 477 U.S. at 414 (quoting Ake v. Okla., 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985)). 
96 Ford, 477 U.S. at 414. 
97 Id. at 415. 
98 Id. 
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inconsistent.”99 The Supreme Court feared that there would be a 
“significant possibility that the ultimate decision made in reliance 
on [state] experts will be distorted” under Florida’s procedure 
which failed to provide the prisoner’s representative with the 
opportunity to clarify or challenge the state experts’ opinions or 
methods.100 
The third and “most striking defect” in Florida’s procedure was 
the placement of the ultimate decision “wholly within the 
executive branch.”101 Florida’s procedure provided that the 
governor appointed the experts and ultimately decided whether 
the state could carry out the death sentence that it has sought. 102 
The Supreme Court found this especially troublesome because the 
governor’s subordinates were responsible for “initiating every 
stage of the prosecution of the condemned from arrest through 
sentencing.”103 Therefore, neutrality was wholly absent from the 
procedure, which is absolutely necessary for reliability in the fact-
finding proceeding.104 
While it left the task of developing constitutional procedures to 
the states, the Supreme Court eloquently stated that: 
[T]he lodestar of any effort to devise a procedure must be 
overriding dual imperative of providing redress for those 
with substantial claims and of encouraging accuracy in the 
fact-finding determination. The stakes are high and the 
‘evidence’ will always be imprecise. It is all the more 
important that the adversary presentation of relevant 
information be as unrestricted as possible. Also essential is 
that the manner of selecting and using the experts 
responsible for producing that “evidence” be conducive to 
the formation of neutral, sound, and professional judgments 
as to the prisoner’s ability to comprehend the nature of the 
penalty. Fidelity to these principles is the solemn obligation 









105 Id. at 417. 
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B. Hall v. Florida 
In 2002, the Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the intellectually 
disabled.106 As a result of Atkins, Hall filed a motion claiming that 
he had an intellectual disability and, therefore, he could not be 
executed.107 When Florida held a hearing to consider his motion, 
Hall again presented evidence of his intellectual disability, 
including an IQ test score of 71.108 In response, Florida argued 
that its law required that, as a threshold matter, Hall show an IQ 
score of 70 or below before he could present any additional 
evidence of his intellectual disability; therefore, he could not be 
found intellectually disabled.109 The Florida Supreme Court 
rejected Hall’s appeal and held that Florida’s IQ cutoff was 
constitutional.110 
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Florida statute at 
issue was unconstitutional.111 It threw out Florida’s threshold IQ 
test by holding that “the law requires that [Hall] have the 
opportunity to present evidence of his intellectual disability, 
including deficits in adaptive functioning over his lifetime” and 
that Florida’s statute was invalid under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause of the Constitution.112  
On its face, the Florida statute was consistent with both the 
views of the medical community and Atkins; nothing in the 
statute’s text precluded recognition of a defendant’s IQ score as a 
range as mental health professionals do.113 However, the Florida 
Supreme Court interpreted the statute more narrowly and “held 
that a person whose [IQ] test score is above 70, including a score 
 
106 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1991; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
107 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1991-92. 
108 Id. at 1992. The Court notes that Hall had nine IQ evaluations with scores ranging 
between 60 and 80. The sentencing court excluded two scores below 70 for evidentiary 




112 Id. at 2001. 
113 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1994. The Florida statute defined intellectual disability for 
purposes of an Atkins proceeding as “significantly sub-average general intellectual 
functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during 
the period from conception to age 18.” It further defines “significantly sub-average general 
intellectual functioning” as “performance that is two or more standard deviations from the 
mean score on a standardized intelligence test.” 
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within the margin for measurement error, does not have an 
intellectual disability and is barred from presenting additional 
evidence asserting the argument that he is so disabled.”114 
The Supreme Court found that through its interpretation, 
Florida “[went] against the unanimous professional consensus.”115 
Further, it stated that states must “afford these test scores the 
same studied skepticism that those who design and use the tests 
do, and understand that an IQ test score represents a range rather 
than a fixed number.”116 Finally, the Supreme Court declared 
that: 
The death penalty is the gravest sentence our society may 
impose. Persons facing that most severe sanction must have 
a fair opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits 
their execution. Florida’s law contravenes our Nation’s 
commitment to dignity and its duty to teach human decency 
as the mark of a civilized world. The States are laboratories 
for experimentation, but those experiments may not deny 
the basic dignity the Constitution protects.117 
C. Guidelines for Determining a Defendant’s Severe Mental 
Illness 
The Supreme Court has left the task of developing the exact 
procedures for executing sentences to the states.118 In the context 
of determining eligibility for the death penalty for defendants 
claiming severe mental illness, the states should be guided by Ford 
and Hall.  Additionally, there are a few procedures that the 
Supreme Court not only look for but also require. 
First, a state’s procedure for determining eligibility for the death 
penalty for defendants claiming severe mental illness must 
include the defendant in the process by allowing him and his 
representatives to set forth any materially relevant information 
about his mental health.  This would provide the factfinder with 
all the information needed to make the ultimate decision of death 
penalty eligibility, including evidence of mental health 
 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 2000. 
116 Id. at 2001. 
117 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 2001. 
118 Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17. 
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professionals who may disagree with one another.  It is the 
factfinder’s job to resolve such disagreements.  Further, allowing 
the defendant to offer evidence that he deems materially relevant 
will also allow him to provide a more extensive evaluation of his 
mental health that may be more in depth than that done by the 
state. 
Second, such a procedure must include a way for the defendant 
to challenge evaluations done by the state.  When a defendant 
makes such a challenge, the evaluating psychiatrist should be 
required to disclose the process of his evaluations including the 
basis of his evaluation, exact factors used in the evaluation, 
history or risk of error in the evaluation, and response to any 
ambiguity claimed in the evaluation.  Furthermore, the evaluating 
psychiatrist should be required to submit an affidavit providing 
for any personal bias in relation to the death penalty along with 
his confidence in the conclusions found by the evaluation. 
Third, the procedure should have a separation between the 
authority charged with the ultimate decision of death penalty 
eligibility and the authority of appointing psychiatric experts to 
determine the defendant’s mental health status.  Finally, the 
evaluation done by the state should conform to the customary 
standards and norms of the usual procedures and methods 




The Supreme Court has established several exemptions from 
the death penalty for qualifying individuals.  These individuals 
include juveniles, the insane, and the intellectually disabled.119 
However, it has failed thus far to establish an exemption for 
individuals suffering from severe mental illness.  These 
individuals are so vulnerable that they are unable to defend 
themselves from the government’s harshest form of punishment.  
In addition, the three principle rationales that justify punishment 
– deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution – are completely 
absent from executing the severely mentally ill.  Furthermore, the 
 
119 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575; Ford, 477 U.S. at 399; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
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Supreme Court has used these three principle rationales 
extensively in the opinions that have created such exemptions.120 
Combining the evolving decency standard along with the Court’s 
notion that it is the ultimate decision maker, I urge the Court to 
create the overdue exemption for severely mentally ill offenders.  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted its role as the 
Judiciary by stating that “the Constitution contemplates that in 
the end [its] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question 
of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth 
Amendment”121 and that the “exercise of independent judgment is 
the Court’s judicial duty.”122 However, in failing to do so, the 
Supreme Court has undermined its own authority and 
independent judgment as the evolving standards of decency, along 
with the medical and legal communities, which relentlessly urge 
it to act.  
 
 
120 “First, there is a serious question whether either justification underpinning the 
death penalty—retribution and deterrence of capital crimes—applies to mentally retarded 
offenders. As to retribution, the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends 
on the offender’s culpability. If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to 
justify imposition of death (citation omitted) the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded 
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution. As to deterrence, the same cognitive 
and behavioral impairments that make mentally retarded defendants less morally culpable 
also make it less likely that they can process the information of the possibility of execution 
as a penalty and, thus, control their conduct based upon that information. Nor will 
exempting the mentally retarded from execution lessen the death penalty’s deterrent effect 
with respect to offenders who are not mentally retarded. Second, mentally retarded 
defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution because of the 
possibility that they will unwittingly confess to crimes they did not commit, their lesser 
ability to give their counsel meaningful assistance, and the facts that they are typically 
poor witnesses and that their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of 
remorse for their crimes.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 305 (citing Godfrey v. Ga., 446 U.S. 420, 433 
(1980); “Once juveniles’ diminished culpability is recognized, it is evident that neither of 
the two penological justifications for the death penalty—retribution and deterrence of 
capital crimes by prospective offenders (citation omitted) provides adequate justification for 
imposing that penalty on juveniles.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 553. 
121 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1999-2000 (quoting Coker v. Ga., 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) 
(plurality opinion)). 
122 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 2000 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 564). 
